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[I] INTRODUCTION  
 
The difficulty of choice refers to the effort involved in the 
process of deliberation whenever the agent is confronted with a 
set of alternatives whose consequences are evaluated in a 
multidimensional space of incommensurable and conflictive 
values (see Costa [1]). Tension stemming from the conflict 
between values (or ends) and reluctance to trade off those 
values against each other is the source of difficulty.  
 
Behavioral sciences, especially cognitive and social 
psychology, neurosciences and behavioral economics (see for 
example Tetlock et al. or Greene et al. in [2-13]), and 
philosophy (see for example Dewey or Nussbaum in [14-24]) 
have recognized the difficulty of choice as a pervasive feature 
of human decision making.  
 
In contrast, for the neoclassical economics rational choice 
model, commensuration is assumed as a precondition for 
choice, and choice as evidence of the overcoming of the 
conflict between values (or ends) through commensuration. In 
fact, rationality is conceived in neoclassical economics as 
consistency of choice: a choice is rational to the extent that the 
agent facing a set of alternatives and another set of 
consequences of those alternatives is able to articulate 
preference relations between all pairs of alternatives 
(completeness) and the resulting preference ordering is 
transitive. It may be inferred from completeness and 
transitivity, that there is a preference index (utility function). 
Utility is thus a unique and abstract measure to which the 
multiple dimensions of evaluation of alternatives may be 
reduced and choice involves only a value maximization 
problem. A crucial implicit assumption of the neoclassical 
economics rational choice model is the reducibility of all value 
dimensions to a single common measure, that is, 
commensurability of value. Accordingly, in the case of 
conflicts between values, rationality would always demand 
that concessions in one dimension might be compensated by 
gains in other(s) along the surface of an indifference curve.  
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that individuals do choose, 
but they frequently choose with difficulty, and that choice may 
also be interpreted as evidence of the possibility of overcoming 
conflict without relying on commensuration (see Costa and 
Costa and Castro Caldas [1, 25]). Faced with difficulty, 
individuals may simply refuse to make a choice which requires 
the establishment of tradeoffs infringing normative concerns; 
they may experience moral outrage by the mere contemplation 
of those tradeoffs (see for example Lichtenstein, Gregory and 
Irwin or McGraw and Tetlock in [26, 7, 2, 5]). Moreover, 
individuals make choices that deviate from the predictions of 
the neoclassical economics model of human action. In face of 
difficulty, individuals often resort to heuristics evoked to cope 
with value conflicts and value compositions (see Gigerenzer 
and Gigerenzer and Selten [12, 27]).  
 
Difficulty has both computational and moral aspects. 
Computational difficulty was described by Simon [28] as a 
situation in which the individual “may be trying to implement 
a number of values that do not have a common denominator – 
e.g., he compares two jobs in terms of salary, climate, 
pleasantness of work, prestige, etc.”. Computational difficulty 
is part of what led Simon to the concept of bounded rationality. 
Given difficulty, the individual is compelled to resort to 
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heuristic choice procedures, such as choosing the first 
alternative satisfying aspiration levels, one for each value 
dimension.  
 
Moral difficulty, which Simon did not consider in his 1955 
paper, has the same absence of a “common denominator” to all 
values in common with its computational counterpart. 
However, while the second type of difficulty stems from the 
incapacity to establish the numerical tradeoffs allowing the 
one-dimensional reduction of the multiple values, moral 
difficulty is instead a consequence of the dissonance or tension 
resulting from any attempts at determining these same 
tradeoffs.   
 
Evidence of a more precise distinction between computational 
and moral difficulty has been gathered by psychology, mainly 
cognitive and social psychology, and neuroscience research. 
On one hand, this research suggests that individuals tend to 
spontaneously identify the distinction between these two types 
of difficulty – computational and moral difficulty – and, on the 
other, that the neural correlates observed during actual 
decision-making processes are different and dependent on the 
non-moral or moral coloring of the choice situation. Moreover, 
the neuroscience research shows that neural patterns vary 
across different sorts of moral dilemma.  
 
The paper addresses these developments in psychology and 
neuroscience research with the aim of showing that they are 
putting the neoclassical economics rational choice model under 
pressure. It further argues that these advances may indeed 
cause shifts in the ontology of the individual underlying the 
neoclassical economics rational choice model. This is not to 
suggest that economics, or any other social science for that 
matter, must have a biological foundation. Nevertheless, 
economists must at least come to terms with the implications 
of these advances in psychology and neuroscience research; 
dissonant ontologies across fields of knowledge might be a 
source of intellectual discomfort.          
 
[II] THE DIFFICULTY OF CHOICE: INSIGHTS 
FROM PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE 
RESEARCH 
 
2.1. Psychology research on the difficulty of 
choice 
 
In the realm of psychology, Tetlock’s and colleagues work has 
been exploring the reactions in experimental studies of 
individual participants to different types of transaction: 
“routine tradeoffs”, in which a money counterpart is given for 
goods and services typically exchanged in the market (for 
instance, paying someone to clean my home, buying a house, 
buying food, paying a doctor to provide medical care for me or 
my family, and paying a lawyer to defend me against criminal 
charges in court), “taboo tradeoffs”, in which a money 
counterpart is given for goods and services not usually 
exchanged in the market (for instance, buying and selling of 
human body parts for medical transplant operations, of 
surrogate motherhood contracts, of adoption rights for orphans, 
of votes in elections for political offices, of the right to become 
a U. S. citizen, of the right to a jury trial, of sexual favors 
(prostitution), of someone else to serve jail time to which the 
buyer had been sentenced by a court of law, and paying 
someone to perform military service which the buyer had a 
draft obligation to perform), and “tragic tradeoffs”, in which 
equally important values conflict with each other (see Tetlock 
et al.  [2]).       
 
In one of the experimental studies, participants have to assess 
“routine” and “taboo tradeoffs” by allowing or disallowing 
each one, by morally approving or disapproving these 
transactions and by describing the emotional reactions that 
these transactions have triggered in them (see Tetlock et al.  
[2]). This experimental study aims to show that while “routine 
tradeoffs” are deemed acceptable by individuals as they do not 
trigger any kind of emotional reaction and moral outrage, 
“taboo tradeoffs” give rise to expressions of indignation and to 
emotional stress in the participants.       
 
The other experimental situation implemented by Tetlock et al. 
[2] aims to compare the reactions of spectators to the decisions 
of a hypothetical health care decision-maker who is faced with 
a tragic choice between the lives of two patients, or with a 
transaction that presupposes a monetary valuation to a 
patient’s life. The participants in the experimental study have 
to assess the decision of the health care decision-maker and 
describe their own feelings about this decision. Participants 
also have to consider whether or not if the health care decision-
maker should be removed from his job and, if the health care 
decision-maker was a friend of theirs, whether or not the 
friendship would end if they knew the decision he made. 
 
In the tragic choice situation, the health care decision-maker is 
faced with two children who need a liver transplant. Due to the 
shortage of organs, one of the patients must be chosen. The 
participants (spectators) in the experimental study are informed 
of the duration of the hypothetical deliberation process. In this 
tragic choice situation, the longer deliberation was interpreted 
as revealing awkwardness stemming from the fact that the 
consequences of the choice are always detrimental whatever 
the option taken by the hypothetical health care decision-
maker.  
 
In the other situation (“taboo tradeoff”), the health care 
decision-maker has to decide whether to allow a liver 
transplant (for a child), or if the monetary resources needed 
should be allocated to other needs in the hospital (for instance, 
the acquisition of better equipment, or raising salaries to 
recruit talented doctors). It is now shown that the longer the 
deliberation, the worse the evaluation of the health care 
decision-maker, even if at the end he authorizes the liver 
transplant. In this situation, a longer deliberation process is 
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seen as revealing the admissibility of this type of tradeoff. The 
mere consideration of the sacrifice of a life in exchange of 
greater efficiency is perceived as being corrosive of the 
importance and the meaning of a sacred value (life), even if in 
the end the alternative chosen still upholds that value.  
  
2.2. Neuroscience research on the difficulty of 
choice 
 
The neurosciences provide several studies which try to identify 
the neural correlates of moral judgment and the interaction 
between the brain regions most directly involved in processing 
emotions and cognition. Some of these experimental studies 
contrast different dilemmatic situations – moral and non moral 
-, as well as different types of moral dilemmas. The studies 
converge in the identification of the neural correlates of moral 
emotions and cognition: the frontal lobe (more specifically the 
Brodmann area (BA) 9/10), the orbitofrontal cortex ((BA 
10/11/25), the superior temporal sulcus (BA 39), insula, the 
posterior and anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24/31/32), the 
parietal lobe (BA 7/40), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and 
the ventromedial sectors of the prefrontal cortex (see for 
example Damásio or Adolphs in [29-33], or Greene et al. or 
Koenigs et al. in [3, 6, 11, 4, 8]). Additionally, the limbic 
regions which include the amygdala, the hypothalamus and the 
thalamus are important in processing certain disagreeable basic 
emotions, such as fear and disgust, and also in moral emotions 
processing. 
In the case of experimental studies developed by Greene et al.  
[3, 6], the participants are confronted with the description of 
various moral dilemmas. In each moral dilemma situation, the 
participants have to decide on which is the correct alternative. 
While the participants respond to the various dilemmas, 
magnetic resonance images of their brains are registered. 
 
Greene et al. [3] consider non-moral and moral dilemmas 
which may also be either personal or impersonal (see note 1). 
The non-moral dilemmas are about choices between 
conflicting value dimensions, but where these values 
dimensions are deprived of a moral significance. By contrast, 
the moral dilemmas involve situations where the moral 
salience of the conflicts between values is highlighted. In some 
experimental situations, the conflicts are even between sacred 
values (a human life versus n human lives). Impersonal versus 
personal moral dilemmas draw on some puzzling situations. 
For instance, in the case of impersonal moral dilemmas, a 
runaway trolley that mortally threatens five people may be 
diverted onto a side track, where it will kill only one person. In 
the case of personal moral dilemmas, experimental subjects are 
faced with the alternative of pushing someone in front of a 
runaway trolley, killing the person pushed but saving five 
others (see note 2).  
 
This experimental study shows that dilemmatic situations 
differ in the extent to which emotions are engaged in reaction. 
Not only is emotional stress stronger in moral dilemmas than 
in non-moral dilemmas, but it is also stronger in personal 
moral dilemmas than in impersonal moral dilemmas. This is 
revealed by increased brain activity in regions related to social 
and/or moral emotion processing (see note 3). Moreover, in the 
personal moral dilemma condition, the experimental subjects 
who approve an alternative which triggers a negative 
emotional reaction tend to have a longer reaction time. For 
instance, in the footbridge dilemma situation, subjects who 
approve of pushing someone in front of a runaway trolley, 
killing the person pushed but saving five others, have to 
override a negative emotional response which requires an 
additional cognitive control. This is revealed by increased 
brain activity in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) and also by a longer reaction time. In other 
conditions - impersonal moral dilemma and non-moral 
dilemma –no difference is found in reaction time.  
 
Greene et al. [6] explore the reasons underlying this difference 
in reaction time between the personal moral dilemma condition 
and the remaining conditions. The experiment tests the 
difference between difficult and easy personal moral dilemmas 
and tests the conjecture that the longer reaction time, which is 
a feature of the first type of dilemma, results from the conflict 
experienced when the surveillance of a utilitarian moral 
reasoning depends on a disgusting personal intervention (see 
note 4).  The conjecture is corroborated by the observation of 
more intense brain activity in regions associated with the 
control of cognitive conflicts and processes of abstract 
reasoning (more precisely, the anterior and posterior cingulate 
cortex (BA 32/23/31), parietal lobe (BA 7/40) and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal region (BA 10/46)), together with 
significant brain activity in neural structures more closely 
related with the processing of moral and/or social emotions. 
This pattern of brain activity is not found in the case of easy 
personal moral dilemmas, in which there is no conflict 
between an emotional reaction and a utilitarian moral 
judgment. In these situations, the reaction time is 
comparatively short, and the activity of the neural structures 
more directly related with cognitive conflict and processes of 
abstract reasoning is lower.  
 
These results (Greene et al., Greene and Haidt, and Greene et 
al. [3, 34, 6]) suggest that the longer reaction time in situations 
of difficult personal moral dilemmas is not related to higher 
computational complexity, which is also present in the case of 
easy personal moral dilemmas, but to the conflict arising from 
the moral judgment of competing choice alternatives and the 
corresponding emotional reaction. The authors proposed a dual 
process theory of moral judgment, in which emphasis is given 
to a function of control and inhibition of cognitive processes 
over emotional responses (see note 5). 
 
Koenigs et al. [11] tested these moral experimental conditions 
in patients with emotion-related damage in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. Their aim is to identify a causal relationship 
between the neural structures more closely related with the 
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processing of moral and/or social emotions and the moral 
judgment. This experimental study shows that, in the personal 
moral dilemma situation, the patients with emotion-related 
damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are more willing 
to agree to endorse harmful actions in accordance with a 
utilitarian reasoning than the other experimental subjects 
(healthy individuals and individuals with neural lesions in 
other brain regions).   
 
[III] DISCUSSION 
 
This psychology and neuroscience research is inspiring in 
terms of the distinction between a moral and a computational 
dimension of the difficulty of choice. This investigation 
suggests that: (a) individuals spontaneously operate a 
distinction between moral and non-moral dilemmas and 
between different types of moral dilemma; (b) this distinction 
is grounded on a difference in the specific neurophysiologic 
processes involved; (c) not only are the chooser and the doer 
aware of this difference, but also the observers. In fact, 
observers tend to interpret the same signal (for instance, the 
reaction time in a deliberation process) differently depending 
on the type of dilemma evoked; (d) when there is an alternative 
which is deemed both morally appropriate and triggers a 
positive emotional reaction, the reaction time is comparatively 
short; (e) when the consequences of the choice’s are all 
morally and emotionally detrimental or (f) when there is a 
conflict stemming from the fact that the surveillance of a 
utilitarian moral reasoning depends on a disgusting personal 
intervention, the reaction time is longer.   
 
It could be argued that the distinction between a moral and a 
computational difficulty not only makes sense but is supported 
by evidence. However, it may be insufficient in that there may 
be different types of moral and computational difficulty. 
Moreover, the evidence also suggests that moral difficulty is 
not different from computational difficulty because the former 
type belongs to the realm of emotions. Not only do emotions 
relate to both but cognitive elements may also be present with 
emotions in the case of moral difficulty. It can even be claimed 
that this cognitive element may sometimes play a regulative 
function over emotions (Greene et al., Greene and Haidt, and 
Greene et al. [3, 34, 6]). On the other hand, emotional 
elements may be present even when assessing morally neutral 
consequences of action, as suggested by the somatic marker 
hypothesis (see Damásio [29]).  
 
The results also suggest that the different brain regions which 
are identified as associated to moral judgment also participate 
in other processes that are not specifically moral, e.g. 
physiological regulation functions that generate avoidance and 
approach behavior and social behavior in general. Many of 
these brain structures sustain the capacity to represent the 
mental states of other individuals by inferring their beliefs and 
intentions (“theory of mind”, mirror neurons) (see note 6). 
 
However, the neuroscience research so far is not suitable to 
address moral difficulty in ordinary situations as since it only 
draws on extreme dilemmatic situations. As stated by Moll et 
al. [8]: “[t]he making of moral judgments on extreme and 
unfamiliar situations, such as those posed by classic moral 
dilemmas, offers interesting ways to probe philosophical 
points of view, but can hardly be taken as a proxy for everyday 
moral reasoning”. The same authors argue in favor of 
extending neuroscience research to these more familiar and 
current moral dilemmas. Moreover, an extension of 
experimental conditions to actual situations of interaction and 
choice, instead of hypothetical situations, could also offer 
more insights into how individuals cope with value conflicts 
that arise in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, the experiments in psychology and neuroscience 
research suggest that the attribution of a money price to goods 
and services that are not usually object of market transactions 
may be a source of moral difficulty.  These results are puzzling 
from the perspective of the neoclassical economics rational 
choice model. In fact, descriptive validity of its assumptions 
that rationality always requires the establishment of tradeoffs 
between all values and that valuing something means ascribing 
a monetary counterpart to seem to be disproved. The view of 
individuals as mere “wantons” whose only purpose would be 
the satisfaction of their first order desires, as is highlighted by 
the neoclassical economics rational choice model, is also put 
under pressure. However, the question of how and why certain 
transactions and not others are seen as problematic remains; 
why the assignment of a money price to certain goods and not 
others may corrupt their value and significance. It might be 
conjectured that this could happen when the attribution of a 
money price or any other type of tradeoff blocks the possibility 
for individuals to express certain judgments about themselves, 
about others and about the nature of the economic and social 
relations involved in such transactions. This suggests that 
moral difficulty may not only be relevant in extreme 
dilemmatic situations, but may in fact be a relatively common 
feature of choice situations in social contexts.  
 
[IV] CONCLUSION 
 
The paper is grounded on the concept of the difficulty of choice, 
which has been recognized as a pervasive feature of human decision 
making by behavioral sciences, especially cognitive and social 
psychology, neurosciences and behavioral economics. The distinction 
between a computational and a moral aspect of difficulty is drawn 
with the support of empirical evidence from psychology and 
neuroscience research.  The limits of this research to address moral 
difficulty in ordinary situations are also acknowledged. The paper 
further argues in favor of the idea that the developments from 
psychology and neuroscience research may put the neoclassical 
economics rational choice model under pressure by revealing its 
explanatory fragilities.  
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NOTES 
 
(1) www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2105/DC1 
contains a complete description of the sixty dilemma situations 
that participants have to deal with. 
(2) “Me hurt you” is the label that appears in the literature in 
connection to the moral personal violations (Greene et al.  [3, 
6]). This type of moral violation pertains to bodily offences, 
inflicted on a particular individual or group of individuals, and is 
the result of a direct and deliberate action from the agent.   
(3)  The brain regions where an increase brain activity is 
registered, by fMR image, are: frontal lobe (more precisely the 
BA 9/10), superior temporal sulcus (BA 39) and posterior 
cingulate cortex (BA 31) (Greene et al. and Greene and Haidt 
[3, 34]). On the other hand, the brain regions correlated with 
work memory, like the frontal lobe (BA 46) and the parietal lobe 
(BA 7/40), show an increase in activity in impersonal moral 
dilemmas and in non moral dilemmas. Finally, there is not a 
significant difference of brain activity between impersonal moral 
dilemma and non moral dilemma in the superior temporal 
sulcus (BA 39), in the frontal lobe (BA 46) and in the parietal 
lobe (BA 7/40). 
(4) One of the tragic examples evoked is of a group trying to hide 
from a Nazi persecution in which a child may at any moment 
cry calling the enemies’ attention.   
(5) Greene et al. [35] aim to outline more evidence for a difference 
between utilitarian and non utilitarian moral reasoning. While 
the former is more closely related with controlled cognitive 
processes, the latter tends to be driven by more automatic 
processes.  This experimental study shows that the cognitive 
load increases the average reaction time only for utilitarian 
judgments. In the case of non utilitarian judgments, the 
cognitive load has no significant impact on the average reaction 
time. 
(6) These regions are the frontal lobe (more specifically BA 9/10), 
the superior temporal sulcus (BA 21/39), the region most 
anterior of the anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32), and the 
parietal lobe (BA 40) (see for example Frith and Frith or Decety 
and Chaminade in [36-39]). 
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